






Multi-agency working (MAW) has increasingly been considered a promising ap-
proach to preventing violent radicalisation, allowing early and effective identifica-
tion of individuals who may be at risk of violent radicalisation, and breaking down 
historical silos between agencies. 
This article provides an overview of the MAW approaches in the context 
of violent radicalisation in three countries: Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Germany. Although these countries are neighbouring, the MAW approach 
is very different in each, in terms of legislation (e.g., on information shar-
ing), structure (e.g., level of organisation, key actors), procedures (e.g., case 
management) and goals (e.g., target groups, role and function). There does 
not seem to be one general MAW approach in the field. This article identifies 
the goals, partnership, governance, information sharing, and other issues 
that can strengthen local MAW approaches.
Through the ‘Evaluation and Mentoring of the Multi-Agency approach to 
violent radicalisation’ (EMMA) project, the question ‘What works under 
what conditions?’ will be assessed in each country by means of a realist 
process evaluation. As part of the project, a practical self-evaluation tool 
is being developed for local officials that will be widely applicable across 
different MAW approaches in Europe. 
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to prevent violent radicalisationa Introduction
The problem of preventing and tackling violent radicalisation is very similar to the 
problem of crime prevention in general: there is no shortage of risk and protective 
factors, and there is robust discussion on the importance of each risk factor. This 
risk factor approach has led to a wide variety of theoretical models so far.1 Despite 
the fact that various models of violent radicalisation have been developed over the 
years,2 there is no single answer to the question of why a person becomes radical-
ised – violent extremists and terrorists do not have one specific profile. However, 
scientists do agree on the process-oriented nature of violent radicalisation, in which 
committing a terrorist act is the final step.3  
As a consequence, efforts have focused on trying to prevent violent radicalisation 
rather than attempting to stop a terrorist attack.4 Preventing violent radicalisa-
tion is not a task that can be successfully undertaken by one actor, as there is no 
generalisable and identifiable terrorist profile, and the violent radicalisation process, 
which includes various individual and group processes (in-group and out-group 
processes) playing a role, is very complex. 5 In recent years, the focus has concen-
trated on bringing together different actors to prevent violent radicalisation through 
a multi-agency approach.6 
According to the RAN policy paper (2018),7 multi-agency structures and working 
processes are crucial in the early and effective identification of individuals who are 
at risk of violent radicalisation. Multi-agency working (MAW) breaks down traditi- 
onal silos between agencies, and creates cooperation rather than a fragmentation 
of services, improved information sharing, joint decision-making and coordinated 
efforts. An important factor here is the involvement of the local level in the preven-
tive approach to violent radicalisation. Local actors (e.g., cities or municipalities) 
are the closest to citizens, have access to most information, and are therefore in 
the best position to identify vulnerable individuals and to develop and implement a 
tailor-made approach.8  
1.      Per-Olof H. Wikström and Noémie Bouhana, “Analyzing radicalization and terrorism: A situational action theo-
ry,” In The Handbook of the Criminology of Terrorism, eds Gary LaFree & Joshua Freilich (New York: John Wiley 
& Sons, 2017), 175-86; Per-Olof H. Wikström and Kyle Treiber, “Beyond risk factors: An analytical approach 
to crime prevention,” In Preventing Crime and Violence (Cham: Springer, 2017), 73-87; Per-Olof H. Wikström, 
“Does everything matter? Addressing the problem of causation and explanation in the study of crime,” In When 
Crime Appears: The role of emergence, eds Jean McGloin, Christopher Sullivan and Leslie Kennedy (New York: 
Routledge, 2011), 53-72.
2.    Stéphanie De Coensel, “Processual models of radicalization into terrorism: A best fit framework synthesis,” 
Journal for Deradicalization (2018) 17: 89-127; Gary LaFree and Joshua Freilich, The Handbook of the Crimi-
nology of Terrorism (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2016).
3.    Keiran Hardy, “Comparing theories of radicalization with countering violent extremism policy,” Journal for 
Deradicalization 15 (2018): 78-81; Amy Thornton and Noémie Bouhana, “Preventing radicalization in the UK: 
Expanding the knowledge-base on the Channel programme,” Policing: A journal of policy and practice (2019): 
13(3), 331-44.
4.      Isabelle Pistone et al., “A scoping review of interventions for preventing and countering violent extremism: 
Curent status and implications for future research,” Journal for Deradicalization (2019) 19: 1-5.
5.        Kees Van den Bos, Why People Radicalize: How unfairness judgments are used to fuel radical beliefs, extre-
mist behaviors, and terrorism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
6.     Alejandro Beutel and Peter Weinberger, “Public–private partnerships to counter violent extremism: Field prin-
ciples for action,” Final Report to the U.S. Department of State (2016): 5.
7.     Magnus Ranstorp and Umair Ahmed, “Developing a local prevent framework and guiding principles-Part 2,” 
RAN Policy Paper (2018): 5-8.
8.     Sue Roberts, “Detecting radicalisation in communities: The role of multi-agency partnership and the power of 
local information,” RAIS (2018): 42.
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This article presents an overview of different MAW practices in three neighbouring 
countries: Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany. We start with a description of 
LISC-R (Local Integrated Security Cell – Radicalism), the Belgian multi-agency plat-
form that works to prevent violent radicalisation, and detail its legislation, structure 
and information sharing. We then compare it with MAW in the Netherlands and Ger-
many. In the final section, we outline the EMMA project.9 This project, funded by the 
European Union’s Internal Security Fund – Police, focuses on MAW in Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Germany and aims to develop a self-evaluation toolkit for these 
agencies, to enhance the self-reliance of local actors in improving the existing struc-
tures. Information on the Belgian, Dutch and German structures was primarily col-
lected by consulting experts in the field (EMMA project partners, data protection 
officer and relevant MAW actors from the three countries) and supplemented with 
relevant literature and legal documents. A concise overview of the MAW approach-
es in these three countries can be found in the appendix.
The LISC-R in Belgium
Origins
European countries have followed a trend of taking a multi-agency approach to 
the prevention of violent radicalisation. This can be seen in the Danish use of in-
fo-houses and the United Kingdom’s use of Luton Family Safeguarding. From 2012, 
cities and municipalities across Europe started developing strategies to deal with 
the problem of combatants leaving for Syria, the so-called foreign terrorist fighters 
(FTFs). In Belgium, there was an increasing need for an adapted approach to this 
complex situation. It is for this reason that in 2015 the Belgian Minister for Security 
and Home Affairs, Jan Jambon, and the Minister of Justice, Koen Geens, sent out a 
circular (omzendbrief/circulaire) in which a multi-agency approach was referred to 
for the first time, in the context of ‘Local Integrated Security Cells’ (in Dutch: Lokale 
Integrale Veiligheidscellen – LISC).10 
After a series of terrorist attacks in Belgium and other countries in 2016, policy-mak-
ers became increasingly aware of so-called homegrown terrorist fighters (HTFs) 
who were being radicalised on Belgian soil. In addition to focusing on FTFs, policy-
makers now had to develop an approach to prevent violent radicalisation locally.11 
More and more municipalities established a LISC, but the lack of a legal framework 
created problems with respect to professional secrecy, information sharing and 
other issues relating to the organisation of the LISC. 
9.    The Evaluation and Mentoring of the Multi-Agency approach to violent radicalization (EMMA) project is coor-
dinated by the Vereniging van Vlaamse Steden en Gemeenten (VVSG, Belgium) in collaboration with Ghent 
University (Belgium), RadarAdvies (the Netherlands) and the Violence Prevention Network (VPN, Germany). 
10.   Omzendbrief betreffende de informatie-uitwisseling rond en de opvolging van foreign terrorist fighters afkom-
stig uit België en de inperkingen van de dreiging die ervan uitgaan (21 augustus 2015), (Brussel: Minister van 
Binnenlandse zaken en Minister van Justitie); Circulaire relative à l’échange d’informations et au suivi des 
foreign terrorist fighters (21 août 2015), (Bruxelles: Ministre de l’intérieur et du Ministre de la Justice).
11.  Nathan Irwin, “The complexity of responding to home-grown terrorism: radicalization, deradicalization and 
disengagement,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism (2015) 2: 167-68.
Legislation
Eventually, on 13 July 2018, legislation for the LISC-R came into effect. From that 
point on, municipalities were obliged to establish or join a LISC-R. The ‘R’ was added 
to the name to emphasise the focus of this MAW structure on radicalism and its ob-
jective as the prevention of terrorist crimes.12  This general objective can be divided 
into two aims: (1) the early detection of individuals vulnerable to violent radicalisa-
tion; and (2) the development of a personalised/tailor-made approach.13 By setting 
up a MAW structure consisting of local actors, each with their own information and 
expertise, policymakers hope to ensure that individuals are thoroughly screened 
and any issues are efficiently followed up.14  
Structure and actors involved
Despite the existence of a legal framework, the Belgian LISC-R landscape is char-
acterised by a wide range in how LISC-Rs are interpreted, set up and organised. In 
practice, every municipality deals with a highly specific context and needs to be 
able to adapt their LISC-R to these local needs. Municipalities can choose to de-
velop their own LISC-R or to join one from the overarching police district. There is 
no universal approach for the MAW structure. CUTA (Coordination Unit for Threat 
Analysis in Belgium) have therefore proposed a standard model, where a distinction 
is made between a strategic and an operational structure. The strategic structure 
(from now on referred to as the ‘strategic roundtable’) should make it possible to 
draw up policy lines and make agreements on the management of cases by the 
operational structure (the ‘operational roundtable’).15 The operational roundtable, in 
turn, is responsible for bringing together local partners for the early detection and 
discussion of radicalised persons. In addition, it is the task of the partners in the 
operational roundtable to implement the strategic policy lines within their local re-
ality. Alternatively, the strategic and operational roundtables can be combined in an 
‘integrated’ roundtable.  A study by VVSG indicates that this is the most common 
structure in Flanders. No less than 67% of the surveyed LISC-Rs consist of one 
roundtable where both the strategic objectives are determined and the operational 
case management is carried out.16 
However, the LISC-R law (13 July 2018) imposes a number of obligations on the 
composition of the MAW structure. Article 3 describes the mandatory actors who 
must participate in the LISC-R. The first of these is the mayor, who is responsible 
for establishing the LISC-R. In addition, the mayor should compile a list of cases of 
individuals who show signs of radicalisation and are possibly in need of a follow-up. 
The LISC-R must screen these cases and determine whether or not a tailor-made 
12.   Wet tot oprichting van lokale integrale veiligheidscellen inzake radicalisme, extremisme en terrorisme (30 juli 
2018), (Brussel: Minister van Binnenlandse zaken en Minister van Justitie).
13.    Bijlage omzendbrief van de minister van veiligheid en binnenlandse zaken en de minister van justitie betreffen-
de de informatie-uitwisseling rond en de opvolging van terrorist fighters en haatpropagandisten (22 mei 2018), 
(Brussel: Minister van Binnenlandse zaken en Minister van Justitie).
14.   On the fifth anniversary commemoration of the Brussels attacks on 22 March 2021, Minister of Justice Van 
Quickenborne proposed a new interpretation of the LISC-R, namely the LISC-P. The Minister wants to use this 
agency to establish multi-agency working in various penitentiary institutions. This MAW agency is intended to 
guarantee early detection and a tailor-made approach. The ultimate purpose of this LISC-P is the reintegration 
of the individual into society.  “Meer controle op radicalisering in gevangenissen,” De Morgen, 19.03.2021, Ac-
cessed 19.04.2021, https://www.demorgen.be/nieuws/meer-controle-op-radicalisering-in-gevangenissen~b-
256d2a4/.
15.   Plan R: verduidelijkende nota over de LIVC-R, (Brussel: Orgaan voor de Coördinatie en Analyse van de Dreiging, 
2019), 6.

































approach should be developed. In order for this screening to be reliable, Article 3 of 
the LISC-R law recommends the inclusion of municipal social actors who, through 
their function and expertise, can contribute to this analysis and the follow-up of 
the individual. As a result of the varied social structures of Belgian municipalities, 
a great diversity of social actors could be represented in the MAW structure, such 
as probation and education stakeholders, health care professionals, welfare institu-
tions, youth centres, social workers, social housing agencies and many others. It is 
the mayor's responsibility to invite these key partners to the roundtable. The second 
required actor within the LISC-R is the information officer. This role is taken by a 
local police officer, who is responsible for the exchange of information between 
the LISC-R and the Local Task Force (LTF).17 The latter platform is part of a verti-
cal structure, implemented in 2013 by the Federal Action Plan – Radicalism (Plan 
R).18 This action plan aims to reduce radicalism and extremism in society through 
integrated collaboration between the various governments in Belgium. The LTF dis-
cusses cases with increased public security risks, and notifies LISC-Rs of possible 
cases within the municipality. A third required actor is the municipal official as the 
coordinator of the LISC-R. This function can be assigned from any department. It 
is, however, recommended that the municipal official has worked in the area of pre-
vention before. It is the coordinator's task to steer the LISC-R in the right direction 
and to build bridges between all actors (i.e., police and social actors). 
Case management and information sharing 
In general, there are two ways in which an individual case can be raised for discus-
sion at the LISC-R. The first is through the vertical top-down information flux with 
the LTF, in which the information is passed on from the LTF to the mayor through the 
information officer. Alternatively, a case can be submitted bottom-up, either via sig-
nalling structures for citizens and organisations within the municipality, or directly 
via a participating MAW actor.19  
In order to obtain a complete, holistic view of each case, participating partners are 
expected to share all the necessary, available information on the case. However, 
many participating actors are bound to professional secrecy, as described in Article 
458 of the Belgian Criminal Law. This makes it difficult, and even in some cases 
prosecutable, to share information under secrecy. In order to facilitate information 
sharing, Article 5 of the LISC-R law states that this body can be understood as a 
case consultation, as defined in Article 458 ter of the Criminal Code. This Article 
allows for an exception to be made to professional secrecy in order for actors to 
temporarily relinquish their own obligation of secrecy.20  
17.   Wet tot oprichting van lokale integrale veiligheidscellen inzake radicalisme, extremisme en terrorisme, art. 4.
18.    Plan R: verduidelijkende nota over de LIVC-R, (Brussel: Orgaan voor de Coördinatie en Analyse van de Dreiging, 
2019), 14.
19.   Maarten De Waele, Hoe een lokale integrale veiligheidscel uitbouwen? (Brussel: Politea, 2018), 72-79.
20.   Strafwetboek, art.458 ter.
 The Care and Safety Houses (CSH) in the Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, the responsibility for developing a preventive approach to 
violent radicalisation lies with local authorities. Municipalities can rely on the facili-
tating support of the Care and Safety Houses (in Dutch: Zorg- en Veiligheidshuizen, 
CSH) as a multi-agency working unit for a number of elements of this preventive 
approach, such as case management. To obtain this support, the local authorities 
can join the regional CSH. 
The philosophy of the multi-agency approach in the Netherlands is the same as in 
Belgium, namely, to facilitate cooperation between different actors and disciplines 
to ensure the prevention of violent radicalisation. As with the Belgian LISC-Rs, this 
prevention practice consists of identifying individuals who are at risk on the one 
hand, and developing a person-centred approach on the other hand. 
How it started
The structure of CSHs originated in the 1990s as ‘Safety Houses’. These were used 
when local authorities wanted to create a partnership between different justice 
actors to develop approaches to complex, multi-faceted problems faced by individ-
uals in multiple life domains that required a multi-actor response. Over the years, 
these structures have been adapted to fit the needs of the local partners, for exam-
ple with the addition of social partners to the MAW structure. These adaptations not 
only resulted in a name change to ‘Care and Safety Houses’, they also led to a pro- 
liferation of CSHs, each with their own structure and organisation, partners and 
working methods.21 CSHs tackle these complex problems with cooperation 
between the criminal justice system, the care sector and municipal authorities.  
Differences in legislation
A first difference between the Belgian and the Dutch approach can be found in the 
legal framework. At the moment, the CSH system lacks a national legal framework 
in the context of violent radicalisation, such as the legislation for the Belgian LISC-R 
that defines its general purpose and structure. However, on the 13 February 2020 a 
legislative proposal was introduced that would include the legal obligation of may-
ors and aldermen to use a case management approach in matters concerning a 
radicalising individual. This legislative proposal also lays down the exchange of 
information between the participating actors. The legislator defines the goal of the 
case management as promoting coordination of measures with regard to persons 
who reside or have resided in the city and can be linked to radicalising activities. 
The intention is to develop an effective approach tailored to the individual. The 
permanent actors – the mayor/the Board of Mayor and Aldermen, police, public 
prosecutor's office, the Ministry of Justice and Security, probation institutions, and 
the Child Protection Board – are also described, each with a specific role in the case 
management.22
21.   Landelijk kader: Veiligheidshuizen, vóór en dóór partners (januari 2013), (Den Haag: Ministerie van Veiligheid 
en Justitie), 11.
22.   Wetsvoorstel persoonsgerichte aanpak en meldingen over radicalisering en terroristische activiteiten (13 fe-

































Differences in the scope of the MAW structure
A second notable characteristic and contrast with the LISC-R is the scope of the 
Dutch MAW structure. In the LISC-R, discussion of cases is only permitted if it 
concerns the prevention of terrorist acts or crimes committed within the frame-
work of criminal organisations.23 This is not the case for the CSH, where all com-
plex problems that meet predetermined criteria can be discussed.24 Four specific 
themes have been defined and are believed to cover a substantial proportion of 
these complex problems, including radicalisation and violent extremism. The other 
themes covered are domestic violence and child abuse, re-integration of ex-prison-
ers posing a security threat, and persons with confused behaviours posing a se-
curity threat. However, these four themes are not exhaustive and do not cover all 
‘complex problems’. Other complex problems that are not covered by these themes 
could thus also fall under the care of the CSH. In principle, a separate roundtable 
could be organised for each theme, consisting of professionals with expertise that 
is valuable to the intervention needed in a particular case.25
Differences in the structure and level of organisation
The third difference concerns the level of organisation. The CSH structure is 
organised on a regional level, per safety region (there are 25 safety regions in 
the Netherlands),26 while in Belgium the LISC-R structure is organised on a mu-
nicipal level (there are 581 municipalities in Belgium). On 1 September 2020 the 
Netherlands had 30 CSHs,27 and Belgium had 272 LISC-Rs.28 
Dutch municipalities and cities have the opportunity to join and be supported 
by the CSH structure when a complex problem arises in their local area. To join 
these structures, local administrations must sign a covenant. This covenant 
regulates the legal embedding of the cooperation structure and the agreements at 
the organisational level, namely the purpose of the structure and the participating 
partners, clarification of a number of terms, the structure of the CSHs and their 
role, and the manner of decision-making and partner consultation. It also contains 
agreements on data collection and processing. A separate covenant was drawn up 
for the issue of radicalisation, with a clear definition of radicalisation, extremism 
and case management, among other things.29
23.   Wet tot oprichting van lokale integrale veiligheidscellen inzake radicalisme, extremisme en terrorisme; Maarten 
De Waele, Hoe een lokale integrale veiligheidscel uitbouwen?, 41-44; Wetsontwerp tot oprichting van Lokale In-
tegrale veiligheidscellen inzake radicalisme, extremisme en terrorisme (2 juli 2018), (Brussel: Belgische Kamer 
van Volksvertegenwoordigers), Art. 3, 17.
24.   These criteria are: problems impacting multiple life domains that have impact on, or are impacted by, the direct 
social environment; and require a multi-actor collaboration OR problems causing a severe security threat.
25.   Landelijk kader: Veiligheidshuizen, vóór en dóór partners (januari 2013), (Den Haag: Ministerie van Veiligheid 
en Justitie).
26.   The country is divided into 25 safety regions (in Dutch: veiligheidsregios). Each safety region has at least one 
CSH, which any municipality in the safety region can join. 




27.   Zorg- en Veiligheidshuizen, “Zoek een zorg-en veiligheidshuis,” Accessed 22.03.2021, https://www.veiligheids-
huizen.nl/veiligheidshuizen.
28.  FOD Binnenlandse Zaken, “Cartografie van de LIVC-R,” Accessed 04.03.2021, https://www.besafe.be/nl/veilig-
heidsthemas/radicalisme/lokale-integrale-veiligheidscel.
29.   Convenant: Persoonsgerichte aanpak voorkoming radicalisering en extremisme, (Den Haag: Nationaal coöri-
nator terrorismebestrijding en veiligheid.
Looking in more detail at the structure of the organisation, there are a number of 
key covenant actors (in Dutch: convenantpartijen) – the so-called ‘triangle’: the mu-
nicipality, the police and the public prosecutor's office. In addition, the 'case actors' 
(in Dutch: casuspartijen) consist of 'the Board of Child Protection' and 'probation 
service Netherlands'. In addition, ‘external case actors’ can join the consultation. 
These are actors that are necessary for the development of a person-oriented ap-
proach, or have specific expertise. Since this differs for each case, these are ad hoc 
contributors who only join the consultations when their expertise is required. 
A noteworthy difference between the LISC-R in Belgium and the CSHs in the Neth-
erlands is the role of the public prosecutor’s office. In the Dutch structure, the public 
prosecutor’s office is one of the major actors, while the LISC-R law in Belgium stip-
ulates that this office is not authorised to participate in the operational roundtable. 
This is to safeguard the preventive purpose of the LISC-R; the link with the security 
services in Belgium has already been guaranteed by including both the police and 
the information officer in the roundtable. However, the Belgian public prosecutor's 
office can, subject to approval, participate in the strategic roundtable.30
Differences and similarities in case management 
The Dutch and the Belgian MAW approaches share the same goal for case man-
agement, namely, to identify and analyse cases, and to elaborate a person-centred 
integral approach. 
In the Netherlands, the case management procedure varies from region to region, 
but it can generally be grouped into several steps, starting with (1) registration and 
case intake, followed by (2) the selection, (3) the individual case approach, and fi-
nally (4) the conclusion. In terms of case intake, only covenant actors are entitled to 
register cases. These agencies are alerted about possible concerns on the basis of 
their own available information, or by a contact point where family and friends, so-
cial organisations and agencies such as youth work can voice their concerns about 
a potentially radicalising individual. After receiving information about a concern, (a 
team of) case management workers consisting of the structure's core actors deter-
mines, by means of a framework, whether the case is admissible for case manage-
ment or not.31 This is the selection phase. If the case is admissible, the necessary 
partners will be identified. In the individual case approach phase, an integrated ap-
proach is set up and the case is followed up until the concerns about an individual 
subside. If no further actions are required after an additional follow-up time, the 
case is closed.32  
Note that in the case of Belgium, the first two phases are merged into the MAW 
structure of the LISC-R. Furthermore, there are no fixed rules for the termination of 
a case follow-up. Decision rules and timings for the closing of a case can thus differ 
from MAW to MAW in Belgium.
To steer their operation, CSHs have an actor similar to the coordinator in the 
Belgian LISC-R, namely the process coordinator. This individual is responsible for 
the preparation of both the selection table and the case management, for recording 
30.   De Waele, Hoe een lokale integrale veiligheidscel uitbouwen?, 83.
31.   Note that although a triage phase itself occurs in every region, it is not necessarily carried out by a separate 
team of triage workers, but can also take place as an internal procedure with the CSH. This depends from 
region to region.


































the decisions of this structure, requesting further information and informing the 
persons involved. A case coordinator can be appointed to coordinate and follow up 
the actions resulting from the action plan.33
A varied approach of MAW in Germany
Germany also tackles the complex problem of violent radicalisation through a vari-
ety of MAW cooperative approaches. Unlike in Belgium and the Netherlands, there 
is no legislation on the issue at the federal or state level, and no overarching national 
framework to describe the structure and organisation of the MAW approach in the 
field of prevention work to tackle violent radicalisation. It would be difficult to intro-
duce such legislation and framework, as there are 16 different Federal State Data 
Protection Acts that apply to all government agencies in the Bundesländer (federal 
states) and specify the EU General Data Protection Regulation. 
To deal with this fragmentation, in 2004 the GTAZ (Gemeinsame Terrorismus-
abwehrzentrum, Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre) was established as a community 
platform of police and intelligence services from federal and state level and others, 
who specialise in the area of Islamist terrorism and extremism.34 The aim of this 
platform is to pool and consolidate information, minimising the loss of information 
and errors through cross-border and cross-agency exchange, bundling the exper-
tise of 40 German security authorities in compliance with the principle of separation 
between the police and the intelligence service. In 2012 the GETZ (Gemeinsame 
Extremismus- und Terrorismusabwehrzentrum) was established in line with these 
principles. GETZ is responsible for dealing with right-wing, left-wing and foreigner 
extremism and terrorism, as well as espionage. Recently, right-wing extremism has 
been the highest political priority.35 Several policy documents have outlined strategic 
aspects of the German approach for combating extremist radicalisation, such as 
the ‘National prevention programme against Islamist extremism’36 and ‘Guidelines 
for a holistic approach for dealing with returning FTFs’,37 which refers to a strong, 
coordinated approach that includes relevant actors on the level of the states, mu-
nicipalities and civil society. 
In contrast to Belgium and Netherlands, in Germany the organisation of local MAW 
structures is not fixed at the local/municipal level (Belgium) or the supra-local/re-
gional level (the Netherlands). Instead, the level of organisation differs across the 
country. Some MAW networks are organised at municipality level, while others are 
part of regional networks.38 As a result, there are major regional and local differences 
in German MAW structures in the context of violent radicalisation, and even within 
33. Persoonsgerichte aanpak voorkoming radicalisering en extremisme: Handleiding voor gemeenten, politie, 
Openbaar Ministerie en ketenpartners (mei 2017), (Den Haag: Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding 
en Veiligheid), 8-10.
34.  Gemeinsames Terrorismusabwehrzentrum (GTAZ) Rechtsgrundlagen und Vergleichbarkeit mit anderen Koo-
perationsplattformen (December 2018), (Deutscher Bundestag).
35.  In March 2020 the federal government sent a strong signal by founding a Cabinet Committee (Kabinettaus-
schuss) to act against several forms of extremism, giving highest priority to combatting right-wing extremism 
and other forms of racial discrimination. As a follow-up, a ‘catalogue of measures’ (Maßnahmenkatalog) was 
recently published by the federal government; Maßnahmenkatalog des Kabinettausschusses zur Bekämpfung 
von Rechtsextremismus und Rassismus (november 2020), (Berlin:Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundes-
regierung), 1-11.
36.  Nationales Präventionsprogramm gegen islamistischen Extremismus (April 217), (Bundesministerium des In-
nern, für Bau and Heimat).
37.   Leitlinien zum ganzheitlichen Umgang mit Rückkehrerinnen und Rückkehrern (September 2019), (Bundesmi-
nisterium des Innern, für Bau and Heimat).
38.   Milena Uhlmann, Evaluation of the Advice Centre on Radicalisation, (Nuremberg: BAMF, 2017), 21.
the same region (Bundesland) the MAW approach can differ greatly. The huge vari-
ety of approaches and structures makes it challenging to provide a comprehensive 
description of the German situation within the scope of this article. Instead, we will 
outline the complex German MAW landscape by briefly describing some of the ways 
MAW structures are organised in several cities.
Scope 
Unlike Belgium (radicalism) and the Netherlands (complex problems in four themes), 
the MAW structures across Germany have no fixed role and function. Instead, they 
determine their own scope and objectives, whether focusing on operational aspects, 
strategic aspects or a combination of the two.39  The general objectives of the MAW 
structures can vary, from building trusting relationships between actors and promot-
ing democratic values by connecting meaningful actors, to raising awareness, sup-
porting information exchange, or discussing recent trends and developments in the 
radicalisation field. Also, the target groups vary substantially. Some structures cover 
the prevention of specific forms of radicalisation, such as right-wing extremism or 
Islamist extremism, while others have an extremely specialised focus on a subgroup 
that is specific to the local context (e.g. young, radicalised females). There is a focus 
on exit work, de-radicalisation, and even on victim support. One advantage of this is 
that the MAW structure can be established according to the needs of the level of the 
structure.
Actors
The key actors involved vary across regions and localities.40 In many cases, we find 
similar key actors are involved, such as the municipality, police, local and regional 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and social actors. Actors from the prison 
administration or youth sector can also be included, depending on the case or sit-
uation under discussion. In rare instances, experts from academic institutions take 
on a facilitating role. Furthermore, the ‘lead’ of the German MAW structure is not a 
‘fixed’ actor from the municipality (Belgium) or organisation (the Netherlands), but 
can vary. They may be someone who has been found/chosen by the municipality, 
with particular expertise, from an advice or coordination centre, or some other per-
son.
Information sharing 
In Germany, as in the rest of Europe, the sharing of information is controlled by data 
protection laws. Which law applies depends on the specific actor within the MAW 
structure. Two main pieces of legislation may apply: the EU General Data Protection 
Regulation, which applies to NGOs across Germany,41 and special data protection 
laws that apply to security services, which are Bundesländer specific.42 In general,  
the government agencies are allowed to handle data if this is necessary to fulfil 
their legal duties. They are permitted to share this information with other govern-
ment agencies if the receiving agencies need those to fulfil their own legal duties. 
39.   Milena Uhlmann, Evaluation of the Advice Centre on Radicalisation, 23. 
40.   Milena Uhlmann, Evaluation of the Advice Centre on Radicalisation, 21.
41.   NGOs: General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) specified by the Federal Data Protection Act (Bundesdaten-
schutzgesetz, BDSG). Important regulations for data handling are for example: Art. 6 Sect. 1 lit. f GDPR and 
Art. 9 Sect. 2 lit g GDPR read in conjunction with § 22 Sect. 1 Number 1 lit. d and § 24 Sect. 1 Number 1 BDSG. 
42.  The following regulations apply for Federal and Federal State security authorities: Directive (EU) 2016/680 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 (on the protection of natural persons with regard 
to the processing of personal data by responsible authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, 

































But there are several area-specific exceptions. For example, particularly restrictive 
regulations apply to information obtained by intelligence or youth welfare services. 
Apart from the valid general rules of data protection, there are no specific legal 
frameworks, platforms or covenants in place that regulate, guide or facilitate the 
sharing of sensitive information in the context of a MAW structure for preventing 
violent radicalisation. Every MAW structure therefore has its own method of dealing 
with data protection, which in some cases can cause discrepancies among actors. 
MAW actors report difficulties with data protection due to competing regulations 
concerning information sharing.
Not all MAW structures necessarily deal with individual case management, as hap-
pens in Belgium and the Netherlands. Some German MAW structures only discuss 
action plans or strategies for dealing with certain situations or groups (situation 
analyses). In some structures, the focus is on information exchange, trends and 
developments in the radicalisation field being discussed, rather than concrete 
cases, groups or situations. However, in the large federal coordination centres, case 
information is exchanged among police and intelligence services.
The EMMA project: evaluation of multi-agency working in 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany
It is clear that the MAW structures in Belgium and the Netherlands vary in a num-
ber of aspects. One thing that they have in common is that evaluation of the MAW 
approach is not structurally embedded in their operations. However, local MAW ac-
tors are keen to know how they are performing and how they can improve, as local 
actors face many challenges in their MAW networks, such as difficulties with infor-
mation sharing, building trust and dealing with legislation. Despite this, local actors 
are willing to learn and implement good practices that can help overcome these 
challenges. 
This need to evaluate the performance of the multi-agency operation has repeated-
ly been emphasised by MAW officials, but it is not an easy exercise given the variety 
of MAW contexts. Evaluations of MAW approaches in the context of preventing 
violent radicalisation are currently scarce.43 Local actors must rely on independent 
evaluators, and opportunities for such independent evaluations are limited. Local 
MAW actors could perform an evaluation of their own multi-agency working, but 
they struggle to do this, as there are currently no blueprints on how to perform such 
evaluation.
       of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA). This directive gets specified by Fe-
deral and Federal State laws; other Federal State government agencies: General Data Protection Regulation 
specified by the Federal State Data Protection Acts and several area-specific legislations (for example social 
security data protection legislations). Important regulations for data handling are for example: Art. 6 Sect. 1 lit. 
e GDPR; other federal government agencies: General Data Protection Regulation specified by the Federal Data 
Protection Act and several area-specific legislations; important regulations for data handling are for example: 
Art. 6 Sect. 1 lit. e GDPR read in conjunction with § 3 BDSG. 
43.  Amy-Jane Gielen, Cutting Through Complexity: Evaluating Countering Violent Extremism (CVE). PhD thesis 
(Universiteit van Amsterdam, 2020), 23.
EMMA-project: Towards a self-assessment tool
To overcome these challenges, the EU-funded so-called EMMA project was estab-
lished in January 2020. EMMA is the acronym for ‘Evaluating and mentoring of the 
Multi-Agency approach to violent radicalisation’. One of the principle aims of this 
project is to develop a practical self-evaluation tool for local officials. This self-eval-
uation tool needs to support all local actors involved in MAW to assess their role, 
service delivery, and indicates the shortcomings. To develop this tool, a process 
evaluation will be performed according to the realist evaluation principle, a method 
originally developed for the evaluation of complex social programs where there is 
an “interplay between individual and institution, agency and structure, and micro 
and macro social processes.”44
A realistic process evaluation
Outcome evaluation is probably the most well-known form of evaluation. It mea-
sures results – in this case, whether the evaluated approach or programme is ef-
fective, i.e. whether it is successful in fulfilling its predefined objectives. Specifically 
in the context of preventing violent radicalisation, toolkits for such evaluations are 
becoming increasingly available. Think about the RAND Corporation’s Program Eval-
uation Toolkit for Countering Violent Extremism45 or the IMPACT Toolkit.46  However, 
outcome evaluation does not provide information on why and how an intervention 
was effective, and hence it is not very useful in developing a self-evaluation tool. 
This is where process evaluation can prove helpful. Process evaluation can be 
used to identify the effective key components of an intervention and thus can help 
explain why a programme is successful (or not), in which context and under what 
circumstances. By understanding how MAW actors and structures try to achieve 
their objectives, and which processes are set in motion in each of these contexts, 
we can explore what works, whether it is promising, and under what context or 
conditions it works. A variety of qualitative methods are used to perform a pro-
cess evaluation, such as interviews with key actors, participatory observations from 
MAW roundtables and focus groups to identify missing elements and to develop 
the self-evaluation tool in collaboration with local MAW actors.
Practical tools and a digital platform for peer-to-peer exchange
The EMMA project aims to create a simple and user-friendly evaluation toolkit that 
will allow local officials to perform a self-assessment of their approach. It will be 
specifically tailored to actors in multi-agency networks in the context of violent rad-
icalisation.
In addition to the scientific evaluation component, the project includes a mentoring 
package whose focus is to offer practical support to the 15 MAW cities in the EMMA 
sample and to improve MAW practices through advice, guidance and peer-to-peer 
assessment. In addition to the toolkit, EMMA aims to deliver a platform where local 
MAW officials learn from each other by sharing best practices. The impact of the 
project will not be limited to the three project countries, as the tools that are created 
will be available for use by local professionals throughout Europe.
44.  Gielen, Cutting Through Complexity: Evaluating countering violent extremism (CVE).
45.   odd C.T Helmus et al., RAND Program Evaluation Toolkit for Countering Violent Extremism (Santa Monica: 
RAND Corporation, 2017). 



































Multi-agency working has proven to be a powerful approach in combating and 
preventing violent radicalisation, due to its multidisciplinary collaboration and 
focus on the local level. However, for a MAW approach to remain effective in the 
ever-evolving dynamics of violent radicalisation, it is important for the actors to take 
the time to collectively reflect on its functioning from time to time. It is only possible 
to remain vigilant against the changing context of violent radicalisation and other 
challenges that will eventually arise in the local MAW through taking an approach 
that is open-minded, with a willingness to be open to change, and by reflecting on 
one’s own functioning as an actor. By opening themselves up a discussion on goals, 
partnership, governance, information sharing, and so on, local MAW actors will be 
able to develop and enhance their professional approach.
Finally, it is important to stress that there is no single, right, ‘one size fits all’ ap-
proach to MAW. By comparing the Belgian LISC-R, the Dutch CSHs and some Ger-
man MAW approaches, we have shown that there are different ways in which MAW 
can be structured, organised and interpreted. Despite all this variety, the EMMA 
project aims to identify the practices that ‘work’ and the initial conditions associat-
ed with them, to adequately translate these into a practical toolkit that is useful in a 
variety of contexts and that will enable local MAW officials to be self-reliant in taking 
an evidence-based approach to assessing their work.
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Appendix: Overview table of the MAW 
approach in Belgium, the Netherlands 
and Germany






Legislation: Law LISC-R 30 July 
2018.47
Obligation to organise an LISC-R 
on local level. Mandatory actors 
(LIVC-R law): mayor, information 
officer and municipal official.
Legislation proposal specific for 
the person-oriented approach 
and notification of radicalisation 
and terroristic activity. 48
National framework for function 
and objectives of the Care and 
Safety Houses (CSH).49
No overarching national frame-
work describing the structure 
and organisation of the MAW in 
the field of prevention work re-
garding violent radicalisation.
Complex legislation on federal 
and state level (Bundesländer).
Information 
sharing
(How? What are 
the regulations?)
Artikel 458 ter Sw.: Shared pro-
fessional secrecy within the 
LISC-R.
Vertical information flow: LTF: 
database FTF/HTF/HP – LISC-R.
Covenant template for local 
actors for information sharing 
- Under which conditions can 
information be shared and with 
whom?
Regulations depend on state and 
federal law, as well as special 
legislation and data protection 
laws concerning actors’ back-
grounds (social security data 
protection e.g. for youth welfare 
services).
No specific legal frameworks, 
platforms, or covenants in place 
that regulate, guide, or facilitate 
the sharing of sensitive informa-
tion.
Which data protection laws apply 
depends on the specific actor in 
a MAW structure. 
EU Data protection law is to be 
applied to NGOs across Germa-
ny.Special data protection laws 
apply for security services, which 
are Bundesländer-specific.50
Exceptions to existing data pro-
tection law can only be made 
in exceptional circumstances, 
which are specified within these 
laws, e.g. when national security 
is at stake. Otherwise, actors ge-
nerally need the individual’s con-
sent to share information.
47.   Wet tot oprichting van lokale integrale veiligheidscellen inzake radicalisme, extremisme en terrorisme (30 juli 2018) 
(Brussel: Minister van Binnenlandse zaken en Minister van Justitie).
48.  Wetsvoorstel persoonsgerichte aanpak en meldingen over radicalisering en terroristische activiteiten (13 februari 
2020) (Den Haag: Minister van Justitie en Veiligheid).
49.  Landelijk kader: Veiligheidshuizen, vóór en dóór partners (januari 2013) (Den Haag: Ministerie van Veiligheid en Jus-
titie), 11.
50.  NGOs: General Data Protection Regulation specified by the Federal Data Protection Act (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, 
BDSG), important regulations for data handling are for example: Art. 6 Sect. 1 lit. f GDPR and Art. 9 Sect. 2 lit g GDPR 
read in conjunction with § 22 Sect. 1 Number 1 lit. d and § 24 Sect. 1 Number 1 BDSG. 
50. For Federal and Federal State security authorities the following regulations apply: DIRECTIVE (EU) 2016/680 OF THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 27 April 2016 (on the protection of natural persons with regard to 
the processing of personal data by responsible authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection 
or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, 
and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA) this directive gets specified by Federal and Federal State 
laws; other Federal State government agencies: General Data Protection Regulation specified by the Federal State 
Data Protection Acts and several area-specific legislations (for example social security data protection legislations), 
important regulation for data handling is for example: Art. 6 Sect. 1 lit. e GDPR; Other Federal government agencies: 
General Data Protection Regulation specified by the Federal Data Protection Act and several area-specific legislati-




The MAW approach can be 
organised at different local 
levels: municipal level or 
 police district level.
Care and Safety Houses are 
organised at regional (safe-
ty region) level. Municipali-
ties can join this structure.
Level of organisation differs across the 
country. Different structures depending on 
region and city. 
Some take place at city-level (e.g. Augs-
burg, Düsseldorf, Chemnitz). Others are 
part of regional networks that have local 
NGO-cooperation partners (e.g. Wegwei-
ser in North Rhine-Westphalia). Different 
structures exist for right-wing extremism 






- Information officer (as  link 
between LISC-R and LTF), 
- Municipal officer (as coor-
dinator).
 Recommended actors: 
 - Social actors (youth servi-
ces, schools, public centres 
for social welfare, etc.). 
Three key actors (in Dutch: 
convenantpartijen): 51
 - Municipality (mayor),
 - Police,
 - Public prosecution service 
(OM).
 Other actors: 
- Child services (Raad voor 
de Kinderbescherming),
- National coordinator for 
Counterterrorism and Secu-
rity (NCTV),
 - Probation services,
- Care and Safety Houses 
(Zorg- en Veiligheidshui-
zen).






- Civil society (sport clubs, mosques, etc.).
 
If applicable:
- Prison / probation,






Depending on the security threat coming 
from a case, the roundtables are organised 
by security services or law enforcement or 
by NGOs and civil society if there are more 
general/less dangerous cases or trends to 
discuss.
Frequency MAW structures choose 
their own frequency (struc-
tural or ad hoc).
MAW structures choose 
their own frequency (struc-
tural or ad hoc).
MAW structures chose their own frequen-
cy, often depending on number of active 
cases and local situation / mandate.
51.  Persoonsgerichte aanpak voorkoming radicalisering en extremisme: Handleiding voor gemeenten, politie,     Openbaar 
Ministerie en ketenpartners (mei 2017) (Den Haag: Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid), 8-10.; 
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Scope and focus, target 
group(s)
Focus on violent radicalisa-
tion.
Target group: Individuals at 
risk of violent radicalisation.
Focus of the CSH is on com-
plex problems: multi-pro-
blems that can only be solved 
through collaboration bet-
ween partners and problems 
that have an impact on family 
or direct environment of the 
individual. 
Radicalisation is part of this 
focus.
MAW structures determine 
their own scope and objecti-
ves. 
Target groups vary substan-
tially according to the MAW 
structure. 
Role and function Strategic function
- Coordination and agree-
ment making for operatio-
nal roundtable, 
- Trust building between 
municipality, police and 
other local actors.
Operational function: 
- Case management: early 
detection, follow-up and im-
plementation of a tailor-ma-
de approach. 
Two main functions of CSH52: 
advising local authorities on 
complex problems and case 
management (follow-up and 
implementation of a tailor-
-made approach).
No fixed role and function. 
Varies depending on specific 
focus and mandate: case ma-
nagement, decision on follow-
-up measures, discussing local 
developments that already 
pose or will pose a problem 
in the future, gathering know-
ledge on phenomena, creating 
awareness, etc.
Evaluation Evaluation is not legally esta-
blished.
Responsibility of the local 
MAW structure.
Responsibility of the local 
MAW structure.
MAW structures are encou-
raged to carry out evalua-
tions by the Dutch gover-
nment and are supported 
/ facilitated to do so, for 
example by the Toolkit Evi-
dence Based Werken.53
No obligation for evaluation, 
but interest to do so to secu-
re long-term establishment of 
the MAW structure.
A nationwide structure in the 
area of evaluation is currently 




52.    Landelijk kader: Veiligheidshuizen, vóór en dóór partners (januari 2013) (Den Haag: Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie), 
14.
53.  Expertise-unit Sociale Stabiliteit, “Toolkit Evidence-Based Werken bij de preventie van radicalisering,” Ministerie van 
Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, accessed on 16.03.2021, https://www.socialestabiliteit.nl/si-toolkit.
54.   Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat, “PreVal – Evaluationsdesigns für Präventionsmaßnahmen”, acces-
sed on 16.03.2021, https://preval.hsfk.de/.
Le martyre constitue un sujet omniprésent dans notre actualité. Or le discours sur 
la mort pour une cause vise de tout temps à promouvoir le caractère exemplaire 
du sacrifice. Cette donnée pose la question de la propagation de cette conception : 
comment le martyre se diffuse-t-il et de quelles représentations sa transmission fait-
elle l’objet ? Cet article propose un examen des modalités de « sporulation » 
du martyre à la fois dans la confession protestante au XVIe siècle et de nos 
jours à travers le cas du terroriste d’extrême droite Anders Behring Breivik. 
À l’instar de la littérature en histoire moderne parue à la suite des récents 
attentats de Paris et de Bruxelles, il s’agira de mettre en lumière, au départ 
de son étude dans le passé, un schéma de compréhension de nos phéno-
mènes contemporains
LA SPORULATION DU        
MARTYRE (XVIE ET XXIE SIÈCLES)
Introduction
À la suite des attentats perpétrés aux États-Unis en 2001, à Paris en 2015 
et à Bruxelles en 2016, plusieurs historiens ont entrepris d’éclairer, à tra-
vers l’étude de leurs domaines respectifs, les rapports entre violence et 
religion.1  En évitant les filets tendus par l’anachronisme et la tentation d’un 
comparatisme simpliste, ces démarches ont prouvé leur pertinence en in-
citant, entre autres, à une prise de champ sur ces faits d’actualité. Elles 
visent de plus à épingler des « motifs » conceptuels qui, s’ils ne se répètent 
pas, trouvent des échos dans le temps présent. C’est le cas, par exemple, 
de l’eschatologie en tant que facteur explicatif des « guerres de religion » 
du XVIe siècle, pensée dont l’analogie avec la théologie djihadiste ne sau-
rait nous laisser indifférents.2  C’est le cas, également, de la propagation de 
la figure du martyr, motif qui nous retiendra ici.
La présente contribution s’inscrit en marge d’une recherche en cours sur le martyre 
réformé.3  Elle s’attachera à l’analyse de la perception du martyre en tant qu’« outil 
1.      Élie Barnavi, Les religions meurtrières (Paris: Flammarion, 2006) ; Élie Barnavi et Anthony Rowley, Tuez-les 
tous ! La guerre de religion à travers l’histoire, VIIe-XXIe siècle (Paris: Perrin, 2006) ; Denis Crouzet et Jean-Ma-
rie Le Gall, Au péril des guerres de Religion ; Le fanatisme religieux du XVIe siècle à nos jours : étudier, com-
prendre, prévenir, éd. Charles Coutel (Arras: Artois Presses Université, 2017) ; Ralph Dekoninck, Horreur sacrée 
et sacrilège. Image, violence et religion (XVIe et XXIe siècles). (Bruxelles: Académie royale de Belgique), 2018.
2.    Crouzet et Le Gall, Au péril des guerres de Religion. Voir les réserves émises sur l’opuscule par Ralph Deko-
ninck. (Dekoninck, Horreur sacrée et sacrilège, 12-13). Sur la pertinence de l’appellation «guerres de religion» 
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